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From the time William Berry Hartsfield became mayor of Atlanta
in 1937 until he retired in 1961, he was one of the most controversial
figures of his time. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how a
long—time segregationist ended up as one of the most liberal mayors of
a major southern city. In addition, this study will attempt to
introduce the reader to Hartsfield the mayor and Hartsfield the man.
William Berry Hartsfield was born in Atlanta, Georgia on
March 1, 1890 to Mr. and Mrs. Charles Hartsfield. He attended Crew
Street School and Boy’s High School, from which he dropped out in his
senior year. However, shortly afterward an aunt gave him money to
take a six month course in typing and shorthand at the Dixie Business
School in Atlanta, upon graduation from which he took a position as
stenographer for American Radiator.1
In 1916, Hartsfield went to work as a clerk in the law firm of
Russer, Staton, Phillips, and Hopkins. In his spare time, he read
widely among the books at his church, the Grant Park Baptist Church,
and the Atlanta Public Library. Then he wrote to the deans of a
number of universities asking for reading lists that would give him
1Harold H. Martin, William Berry Hartsfield: Mayor of Atlanta
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1978), pp. 1—8 and
Joseph B. Cuimning, Jr., “Last Hurrah for Hartsfield,” Atlanta Magazine,
Vol. 1, No. 7, (November, 1961), 30.
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the equivalent of the college education he could not afford. The
reading paid off when, in 1917, he passed the Georgia Bar examination;
later in 1953, he wrote to Ivan Allen that his “alma mater” was the
public library.2
In 1921, Hartsfield went into private law practice. Soon after,
in 1922, he entered politics and was elected alderman, serving from
1923 to 1928 inclusive, and as mayor pro—tern in l926.~ In 1925, he
was appointed to investigate the Candler family’s offer of an automobile
race track as an airfield. He enthusiastically approved it and was
able to obtain the city’s acceptance of it —— thereby beginning a love L
affair that would last throughout his political career and finally
end in the development of Atlanta’s airport that carries his name,
Hartsfield International Airport.4
Hartsfield was temporarily out of politics from 1929 through
1931. In 1932 he again became involved in politics when he ran for
the state legislature from Fulton County and won, after which he =
began promoting Atlanta as a regional air center. In his first act
in the legislature, he introduced a bill that would authorize a city
or a county, or a combination of the two, to build and operate airports
whose facilities would be rented toad-rplane operators and
concessionaires. In 1934, he was re—elected to another term in the
house and, after a brief two—term stay in the Georgia Legislature, he
Martin, William B. Hartsfield: Mayor of Atlanta, pp. 9—11 and
“William B. Hartsfield to Ivan Allen,” 2 January 1953, William B.
Hartsfield Papers, Emory University, Altanta, Georgia. Hereafter
cited as W.B.H. Papers.
3Biographical Sketch, W.B.H. Papers, Emory University, Atlanta.
4Martin, William B. Hartsfield, pp. 12—13.
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returned to city politics.5
In 1936, he ran against James L. Key for the office of Mayor of
Atlanta. During this period in its history the city was bankrupt and
Hartsfield promised to balance the budget without raising taxes. He
also concentrated on the corrupt policies of Mayor Key and his police
chief, alleging that Key was too old to run the city and that he was
trying to use the black population to get elected. In the election,
Hartsfield received 8,951 votesto 8,543 for Key and became Mayor of =
Atlanta; subsequently he did save the city from bankruptcy without
raising taxes, mainly through the help of some of Atlanta’s big
businessmen such as his personal friend and Coca—Cola millionaire
Robert Woodruff.6
In the election of 1940, Hartsfield ran against Roy LeCrew, an
insurance man and former Chamber of Commerce President. The main
issues in the campaign were Hartsfield’s spending too much time on
airport development and the establishment of police traps in and
around the city. He lost to LeCrew, but returned to office when
LeCrew resigned to enlist in the service. In a special election in
May, Hartsfield won and would hold this position until he retired
in l96l.~
By the time Hartsfield had retired as Mayor in 1961, he had
made his mark on the history of Atlanta, especially in terms of race
relations. Moreover, throughout his twenty—three and a half year term
5. . .Biographical Sketch, W.B.H. Papers, Emory University, Atlanta.
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Martin, William B. Hartsfield, pp. 18—19.
7lbid, pp. 32—34.
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as mayor he was constantly made aware of the growing black population
in the city, especially after the Democratic White primary was
outlawed April 1, 1946 in the Supreme Court case of ç~~pman vs. King.
Thus, for the first time since the city election of 1895, blacks
enjoyed full political rights in Atlanta. (Previously blacks had
voted in general, open, and special elections.) Well before 1946,
every effort was made by the Atlanta Negro Voters League and other
black leaders to prepare blacks for full political participation when
the opportunity presented itself.8 By 1946, then, black political
power was an impending reality.
This occurrence was very important in terms of Hartsfield’s
relationship with blacks, because he had to court the black vote, if
he wanted to stay in office after the outlawing of the white primary.
In the special election of 1942 which Hartsfield had won, many blacks
did not support him even though they were allowed to participate in
the election because it was a special election. Thus, when the
white primary was outlawed Hartsfield recognized the importance of the
black vote, knew that blacks would be playing a major role in future
elections, and encouraged the formation of a coalition between
northside white and black voters.
On October 10, 1959, Atlanta had a million people living in
the metropolitan area, a long—term goal of Hartsfield’s. After seven
terms as mayor it was time for Hartsfield to hand over the reign of
power to a younger leader, Ivan Allen, Jr., a civic leader,
businessman, and son of a distinguished Atlantan. On June 7, 1961,
Bacote, “The Negro in Atlanta Politics,” Phylon, 16
(Winter, 1955), 343.
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Hartsfield stepped out of his office and announced to a crowd of
reporters that he was not going to be a candidate for mayor in the
May primary.9 In the election, according to Ivan Allen, Hartsfield
never took a stand in the mayoral race; however, even without
Hartsfield’s formal support Ivan Allen was able to defeat Lester
Maddox with the same coalition of northside whites and blacks to
become the new Mayor of Atlanta.~-°
The outgoing mayor was described by The Atlanta Journal:
He’s got a hot temper, a stinging tongue, a strong will, a
quick wit, a kind, heart, a sense of history, a sense of destiny,
a sense of humor, a capacity for growth, and a built—in finely
polit~al radar set that seldom had failed him in his public
life.
9Martin, William B. Hartsfield, pp. 141—142.
10Ivan Allen, Jr., Mayor: Notes on the Sixties, (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1971), p. 40.
UThe Atlanta Journal, 7 June 1961, , p. 3—C and Martin, William B.
Rartsfield: Mayor of Atlanta.
CHAPTER II
ThE HIRING OF THE FIRST BLACK POLICEL4AN
The decade of the 1940’s saw many unusual events occur in and
outside the United States. World War II had been fought and won by
the Allies. With the return of black and white soldiers home, there
were fears that a depression would occur if reconversion was
mishandled. This kind of fear brought racial antagonism and led to
two major race riots in the North and several lynchings of blacks
in the South. Blacks were still considered “second class citizens”
during that period, as the doctrine of “white supremacy” was the
rule of the day. In Atlanta there were violent attacks against
Blacks.’
One of the most important events that occurred during this
period was the Supreme Court decision of 1945 which outlawed the
Democratic White primary (hereafter referred to as the white primary).
It represented one of the most rigid devices that southern whites
had devised to keep black people down. If a candidate won the white
primary he usually won the general election. Because the majority
of southern whites belonged to the Democratic party, the black vote
would not count in the South until blacks could participate in the
1Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After, (New York:




Although blacks were allowed to vote in special and general
elections the primary was closed to them. This exclusion made it
very difficult for any blacks to seek office in the South. Thus when
the white primary was finally outlawed blacks in the South had a
chance to have a greater voice in government, a fact that politicians
in the South had to take into consideration, even Mayor Hartsfield.
The outlawing of the white primary opened the door to mass voting
by Blacks in Atlanta and all over the South for the first time since
the final days of Reconstruction. Black people in Atlanta began
their march to become a force not to be ignored in the politics of
Atlanta, the state, the South, and the nation.3
This chapter will look at the hiring of the first black
policemen in Atlanta with a major emphasis being placed on what led
to that decision, at that time, and what Mayor Hartsfield sought to
accomplish by being the first mayor of Atlanta to hire black
policemen. The focus, will be on Hartsfield’s motives and reasoning
for this historic breakthrough. The result of the outlawing of the
white primary is evident in this breakthrough.
The total population of Atlanta in 1940 was 302,288. The
black population of the city was 104,514, representing 34.7 percent
of the total population; however, the most important characteristic
2Atlanta Daily World, 16 October 1977, p. 4 and Richard Bardoiph,
The Civil Rights Record: Black Americans and the Law, 1849—1870,
CNew York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970), p. 266.
3Malcom Suber, ‘tThe Internal Black Politics of Atlanta, Georgia,
1944—1964,” Unpublished Masters Thesis, (Atlanta University, 1975),
p. 52.
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of the 1940 census report was that there were 67,908 blacks who were
over the age of twenty—one out of a total population of 204,102 in
that age group. Blacks represented 33.5 percent of the population
in that category, that is, those eligible to vote.4 After 1945,
anyone planning to run for office had to at least take the black
vote into consideration if he wanted to win an election in Atlanta.
According to The Atlanta Daily World, in a seven part series
entitled “Search for Equal Justice,” the ground work for the
hiring of the first black policemen was laid as early as 1922. In
that year 6,000 black voters swung a special election to then Mayor
James Key in return for his agreement to build Booker T. Washington
High School, the first public high school for blacks in Atlanta.5
The Daily World article, by Cornelius A. Scott, the new
publisher of that same newspaper, goes on to argue that the actual
crusade for the hiring of black policemen was started in 1936, the
same year in which Mayor Hartsfield first ran for mayor. Scott
maintained that if there had been black policemen stationed in black
commercial and residential areas, his older brother William Alexander,
the founder of the paper, might not have been shot down in 1934 by
a passing gunman.6 C.A. Scott began with a pamphlet requesting
black policemen and, finally, in 1941 he wrote an article for the
Commission on Interracial Cooperation entitled “It Doesn’t Cost
Nothing to Kill a Negro”, explaining how police would help lower the
4u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth
Census of the United States, 1940: Population, 1, 254 and 375.
5Atlanta Daily World, 16 October 1977, p. 4.
6lbid.
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crime rate in the black community.7
During the 1940’s, and even before, there were more blacks
arrested than whites, and more black homicides. In the January 1,
1948 issue, the Daily World compared homicides in Atlanta among
blacks and whites, demonstrating that between the years of 1938
and 1946 there were 635 black homicides in comparison to 96 white
homicides.8
Throughout the period, there were constant reports of police
brutality and discrimination by the all—white Atlanta police force
towards blacks. According to Mr. B.B.~Beamon in an interview for
the “Living Atlanta” series, “it was not uncommon for the police to
abuse blacks.”9 The major argument for the hiring of black
policemen was that they would help alleviate police brutality and
the high crime rate among blacks in Atlanta.
Eventually, the call for black policemen became more widespread.
In 1945, a protest demonstration was held when two hundred blacks
marched from Auburn Avenue to City Hall carrying posters calling for
the hiring of black policemen in Atlanta. It was a very orderly
march and there was no interference nor were there confrontations
with. the police or anyone else.1-° Blacks were beginning to let their
7The Atlanta Daily World, 30 October 1977 , p. 1 and Charles
L. Rosenweig, “The Issue of Employing Black Policemen in Atlanta,”
Unpublished Masters Thesis, (Emory University, 1980), p. 49.
8World, 1 January 1948, p. 6.
9”Living Atlanta” Broadcast Series, The Fight to Hire Black
Police, B.B. Bemon. Hereafter cited as “Living Atlanta,” Black Police.
10Herbert Jenkins,Forty Years on the Force, (Decatur: National
Graphics, 1973), pp. 44~55. In the “Living Atlanta” series, former
Police Chief Hubert Jenkins state that there were about one thousand
demonstrators.
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feelings be known publicly on a more widespread basis in Atlanta.
One of the primary forces behind the fight for the hiring
of black policemen was the Negro Voters League, which was composed
of many of Atlanta’s major black leaders such as William Holmes
Borders, Warren Cochran, C.A. Bacote, John Wesley Dobbs, A.T. Walden,
C.A. Scott, and Martin Luther King, Sr. In a newspaper article,
Borders gave the following account of what occurred when he and
the people named above went to Mayor Hartsfield concerning the issue:
We went to Hartsfield and asked him to hire black policemen.
We had only 6,000 black registered voters. He told us we
had about as much chance as we had prayin’ in the First
Baptist Church. We went back and added. 10,000 more black
voters, asked him the same question again, and he asked,
when do you want them?11
Warren R. Cochran, the Director of the Butler Street
Y.M.C.A., painted a more vivid picture of what occuri~ed.at the
meeting between Hartsfield and the members of the Negro Voters
League:
Hartsfield was a total segregationist. He told us that
until we got him 10,000 black votes we wouldn’t get
anything. When we got the votes, he listened to us.
But the entire relationship between blacks and Hartsfield
remained a matter of delivering black votes. 12
~-~-Wor1d, 27 October 1977, p. 1. In the “Living Atlanta”
series Reverend Borders states that Hartsfield said, “We will
get Negro policemen in Atlanta as soon as we get the Negro
deacons in the First Baptist Church white.”
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Still another witness, C.L. Harper, who was at that time the
principal of Washington High School, suggested one more reason why
Hartsfield was willing to hire black police at that time:
The reason is steeped in the changing times, and with all
the crusades of that era, black police won acceptance
mainly due to the death knell of the white primary, which
assured thinking white leaders that it would be a matter
of time before blacks become a political powerJ3
Former Police Chief Herbert Jenkins who had witnessed the
demonstration staged downtown for the hiring of black police and
was police chief when the first black policemen were put on the
force, related the following conversation with his predecessor,
Chief Hornsby, about the possibility of hiring black police in Atlanta
during his. administration of the force:




(Contained in the Hartsfield Papers, Emory University)
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Well I was a Captain in the police department and I had
talked to Chief Hornsby, who was Chief of Police at that
time, and discussed with him what was developing and
where it was heading and what was going to come. And I
suggested he and I take our wives and go on a short
vacation. In the meantime stop off in Miami and Savannah.
Also, stop in Richmond, Virginia and Chicago where they
employed black policemen. We discussed it and finally I
went in there one day and said, “When were we going on our
trip?” He says, “Forget it I am not going on any trip and
there are not going to be any black police in Atlanta as
long as I am Chief of Police. And if they ever force it
on me, I am going to resign and am going to retire. I am
going to keep them off as long,,as I can and if they give
them to me anyway, i am gone~ ~
Almost phophetically Chief Hornsby died soon after. Jenkins,
being a close friend of the Mayor, was selected by Hartsfleld to be
the new police chief, a very difficult position to take on because
of the issue of the hiring of black police. But, Jenkins being the
person he was, was more than able to handle the difficult task put
before him, as will be shown in the following pages.15
In his book, Forty Years On The Force, Jenkins offers a very
enlightening and interesting account of Hartsfield and his handling
of the controversial issue:
Mayor Hartsfield was by now pretty much committed to the
idea because he quickly recognized, more than anyone
else at the time, the importance of the Supreme Court
decision in 1945 which abolished the Democratic White
primary. This was the means by which Southerners had
contrived to keep Negroes from voting in Democratic
primaries which in the South at that time was tantamount
to election. Mayor Hartsfield saw the great potential
impact and changes this decision would have on Atlanta
and the nation.16
14s?Living Atlanta,” Black Police, Herbert Jenkins.
15
Jenkins, Forty Years on the Force, p. 39.
16Ibid, p. 45.
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On still another occasion, Jenkins summed up Hartsfield’s attitude
on the issue even better by declaring that,”Hartsfield had seen the
writing on the wall.”~-7
There were during this period, and throughout his tenure as
mayor, a number of Atlantans whom Hartsfield consulted about what
action should be taken on certain issues and upon whom he depended
for advice and counsel. Many were important white business people
who resided on the Northside of Atlanta, including Robert W. Woodruff,
Ivan Allen, Robert MacDougal, Jack Tarver, Ralph Huie, John 0. Chiles,
and others. There were, also, many black leaders who advised the
mayor, such as A.T. Walden, M.L. King, Sr., Warren Cochran, William
Borders, and others. The two groups, considered the white and black
establishment or power structure, respectively, later formed a
coalition that helped Hartsfield stay in office. Still, according
to Jenkins, the overriding force in any discussion was Hartsfield
himself. Although he would listen to the power structure groups,
Hartsfield himself would eventually decide what he thought was best
for the city.1-8
The fight to hire blacks was not an easily won battle, and
everyone involved had to be willing to do his best to make black
policemen a reality in Atlanta. Blacks not only protested and
demonstrated to make it a reality, but they also organized and
informed the community concerning the issues of the black policemen.
According to Chief Jenkins:
17,,
Living Atlanta, Black Police, Hubert Jenkins.
‘8Jenkins, Forty Years on the Force, p. 45—46.
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They did a lot of work with different organizations and
there were a lot of white organizations that came out
publicly and endorsed the project, see, where you did
not have that before. It was certain churches, and certain
civic organizations at that time moved forward in the
public who supported it. See I was convinced as I was
reading the power structure, and that is the business
people in Atlanta that had really run Atlanta for years.
The real power structure as I construed at that time
was leaning in that direction. Now I could set back and
they would be either forced on me or I would be replaced j
and someone else would do it, and I would go back and say
I need the authority I do not have. Mayor I-Iartsfield
decided the best way to hire black policemen was to get
a resolution by the city council; this eventually led to
a hearing for the council’s police committee.’9
Mayor Hartsfield had city councilman Ralph Huie introduce
a resolution to the Aldermanic Board; instead of voting on the
resolution, they referred it to the Police Committee for a hearing.
In addition, some of the Aldermanic Board said they would not vote
on the resolution until they had a recommendation from Chief Jenkins
on whether he was for or against the hiring.of black policemen.
They called a 7:30pm public meeting on November 27, 1947 to hear
from everyone who, was opposed or in favor of the resolution to hire
black policemen. 20
At that Wednesday night meeting there were approximately
1,000 people who filled the seats in Recorder Callaway’s courtroom.
Many of the comments in favor of and against the resolution were
recorded by The Atlanta Constitution.2’
Among the Blacks speaking for the resolution was the Reverend
19”Living Atlanta,” Black Police, Herbert Jenkins.
20jenkins, Forty Years on the Force, pp. 45—46.
21
The Atlanta Constitution, 27 November 1947, p. 1—A.
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Martin L. King, Sr. of the Ebenezer Baptist Church who argued,
“The time is ripe for Negro policemen. No racial trouble will result.
We are not asking for racial equality. All we want is a chance.”22
C.A. Scott, General Manager of The Atlanta Daily World argues,
“Negro homicides have averaged 18 times more than whites for the past
two years. In 1946, there were 95 Negro killings to 10 whites.
Negro policemen can get convicting evidence and can reduce crime.”23
Among the whites opposed were Walter A. Sims, attorney and
former Mayor of Atlanta who claimed,
It seems the colored brothers have convicted themselves. In
one breath they admit they commit the greatest number of
crimes, and in another tell us the violations will be reduced
if we authorize Negro policemen. Until the Negro stops voting
in bloc, there should be no Negro police. Anyway they want
to start too high. We could start them in the City Hall or
some elementary place. We could put some in the tax office.
The Mayor can appoint his executive secretary. Maybe, the
newspaper, who is sponsoring Negro police would put some in
the City Hall press room.24
And Dr. A.H. VanDyke who maintained,
My record has always been to help the Negro. I was a member
of the old police board. When Henry Wallace spoke there
was no segregation of the race. We had Negroes in the
General Legislature as late as 1908. I believe we will
have another white primary law in Georgia next year. Give
the Negroes schools, parks, and playgrounds but don’t
make policemen of them.25








the meeting, but those already cited should give the reader a feel
of what was going on in the minds of the people. Dr. Benjamin E. Mays,
President—emeritus of Morehouse College, best sums up the meeting in
which the issue of the hiring of black police was put before the
general public, “It was so rough, I really thought a riot was going
to break out.”26
According to Jenkins, Hartsfield was always in the background
on the issue, either coaching or guiding everything, until he could
get the resolution passed. Hartsfield had Jenkins write a letter
to the Board in favor, of the resolution. And although ninety—eight
percent of the all white police force was against the resolution,
Hartsfield went before all three watches and told them to give the
resolution a chance, because if they refused it, they would be
forced to accept the black policemen anyway.27
The issue was finally brought before the whole Board on
December 1, 1947, and was passed by a ten to seven vote. The reasons
given by the council for passing the resolution were that a large
number of citizens and civic organizations, as well as both daily
newspapers, had advocated the hiring of black policemen in Atlanta
and that, after examining over forty southern cities which had
black police, they had found that their use aided in preventing the
rise of crime in the black community.28
At the same time, there were many stipulation by which blacks
26
“Living Atlanta,” Black Police, Dr. Benjamin E. Mays.
27Jenkins, Forty Years of the Force, p. 46.
28
Atlanta City Council Proceeding, 1 December. 1947, p. 86
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were to be hired. Some of them were stated in Chief Jenkins’ letter
to the city council regarding the issue: they could be used in
black sections of Atlanta only and they were to be used only on a
trial basis.29
In addition to the restrictions that were included in his
letter to the city council, Chief Jenkins later added more rigid
stipulations on the hiring of black police. To begin with, they
could not exercise police power over whites. Next, a black precinct
would have to be established. Then, a delegation had to be sent
to other southern cities to study their methods of operation and
regulations. Lastly, they would not be given civil service status
until their success had been proven.30
During the December 1st meeting, Councilman Allen
alleged that the issue was a political one, backed by Hartsfield to
secure black votes and that the Mayor’s campaign to annex Buckhead
having failed, Hartsfield was trying to gain the black vote to make
up for this loss. Allen warned that in all probability, blacks
would in the future have their own candidate for Mayor, Council,
and Board of Education.31 indeed, if Hartsfield could have annexed
Buckhead at that time, he might not have seen the need to help
make it possible for Atlanta to have black policemen, because there
were enough whites living in Buckhead at that time to reduce the
30
Ibid, p. 87.
31Ibid. All of the above—mentioned later came to pass; today,
in 1983, one will notice that the city has its second black mayor,
Andrew Young, a City Council and Board of Education that is
predominantly black. Also, the Councilman Allen named above is not
the later Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr.
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pressures that had come about because of the outlawing of the white
primary. Also, Hartsfield had always enjoyed the benefit of most
of his votes coining from the Northside where, in fact, Buckhead was
located. Without a doubt, the failure of Hartsfield to annex that
area may have had a powerful effect on Hartsfield’s willingness to
help blacks.
There were fifty—seven blacks who took the examination for
the police force, many with some college and military experience,
thereby making them more than qualified for the job. From the
fifty—seven only eight were picked as candidates to be trained as
police. After training, they were assigned to a segregated unit
under a white captain. Warren Cochran, the Director of the Butler
Street Y.M.C.A., upon learning from Chief Jenkins that the men were
going to be stationed in an old building on Butler Street over a
liquor store, offered the use of two offices in his basement as a
headquarters for the new black officers. In Chief Jenkins’ judgment,
the thought of black policemen frightened white people; therefore,
he attempted to segregate the black officers until white people
could overcome their fears. Not only were they not to be stationed
in the Decatur Street Police Station, they also were not permitted
to wear their uniforms away from the Butler Street Y.M.C.A. or carry~
their guns home.32
To add insult to injury, legal steps were taken by some whites
to stop the hiring of black police in the city. Yarn vs. the City of
32
World, 27 October 1977, p. 4. All of which probably would
have discouraged the average person, but not these eight new black
officers. Even with these restrictions they attempted to do their
job.
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Atlanta challenged the hiring of black police on the basis that
blacks could not arrest whites, arguing that it was unconstitutional
for black police to be allowed to arrest only blacks. The suit
demanded that a restraining order be put on the hiring of the new
black police officers. On January 28, 1948, Judge Bond Almond,
dismissed the case declaring, “None of our business.” While there
were no more major obstacles placed in the way of the hiring of the
first black police, this did not mean that they would be totally
accepted.33
On April 30, 1948, a Friday evening, the first eight black
police were presented to the public in a formal ceremony at the
Greater Mt. Calvary Baptist Church by the Atlanta Branch. of the
N.A.A.C.P. The first black police in Atlanta were Willie T. Elkins,
Willard Strickland, John Sanders, Jr., Robert MclCibbens, Ernest
Lyons, Johnny Jones, Henry Hooks, and Claude Dixon.34
Mayor Hartsfield, who had been so instrumental in helping
bring about the reality of black police in Atlanta, was the keynote
speaker for that special event. In his speech he assured the
audience that he and the city government were proud to pay honor
to the city’s first black police, that the new officers had passed
the same test, were selected in the same manner, and were trained as
were their white counterparts. He went on to say that, “I firmly
believe they will meet their tasks. Your success is your race’s
33Jenkins, Forty Years on the Force, p. 47. The suit was filed
by some whites who did not want to see any black police, and not
because they were interested about the limited power by which the
new officers were to be hired.
34World, 23 October 1977, p. 1.
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success!” He was later quoted as telling the new officers, “Do the
kind of job that Jackie did in Brooklyn.”35
On May 2, 1948 the first black policemen marched on to Auburn
Avenue, with a crowd of blacks behind them as they took their place
in the community as policemen.36 Not only did they pass their trial
period, but soon all the stipulations placed on them were removed,
and blacks would gradually constitute a sizable proportion and,
finally, a good majority of the police department.
The effects of the first black police were many; most
importantly, their hiring helped to bring about more registered
black voters. The June 26, 1948 edition of the Daily World states
that, according to figures released by Fulton County Tax Collector
and Register, T. Earl Suttles, 82,010 voters were eligible to
vote in the September primary in which Mayor Hartsfield ran against
Charlie Brown, of which number 21,506 were blacks.37 In that primary
a total of 40,055 voters visited the polls, of whom 22,405 were
black. Hartsfield received 20,080 of the votes to 17,255 for Brown.
More than ninety percent of the black voters who visited the polls
voted for Hartsfield.38 This was the beginning of a relationship
that Hartsfield was to enjoy with black voters throughout his tenure
as mayor.
35World, 27 October l977~ p. 1. Jackie Robinson was the first
black to play in the National Baseball League and he also won Rookie
of the Year while playing for the Brooklyn Dodgers.
36World, 3 May 1948, p. 1.
37World, 26 June 1948, p. 1.
38The Atlanta Constitution, 8 September 1948, p. 1. and Rosenweig,
“The Issue of Employing Black Policemen,” p. 75.
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In swmnary, there are numerous reasons why the first black
police were hired at that period, the major one being the outlawing
of the white primary, an act which made many intelligent whites,
including Mayor Hartsfield, realize the political impact this
decision would have on future elections. Since blacks represented
34.7 percent of Atlanta’s total population and 33.5 percent of
Atlanta’s possible voting strength, they had become a group that
had to be dealt with after the outlawing of the white primary.
Another contributing factor was the black community’s ability
to r~gistar voters through the Negro Votero League. Then, using
their voting strength as a bargaining tool, it became possible for
blacks to gain many other social improvements besides the black
police. Thus one comes back again to the major event of that period,
the outlawing of the white primary, because the black vote was to
become important in every election in Atlanta and not only’ in special
elections as before when the white primary was still intact.
Mayor Hartsfield was politically astute enough. to listen to
blacks because of their newly gained political strength. Re
recognized that blacks were becoming a political force in Atlanta.
Although he used blacks mainly for his own political gains, he kept
his promises, thus proving to be instrumental in establishing better
race relations in Atlanta. The one word that could best be used to
describe Hartsfield and his actions would have to be practical. Even
if he did not really care about blacks, he was practical enough,
after the Negro Voters League was able to register more tb,an lO~OO.O.
registered voters, to give them v~hat they wanted. To every’ politician,
votes mean all and Hartsfield was no exception.
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At that time, it must be recognized that the white power
structure, white civic organizations, Chief Jenkins, and the two
newspapers supported him on the issue. As with. so many things, the
timing was right for this historical move. Even though. all whites
and blacks did not support the issue, enough of the public was
willing to see the advent of black police to assure that in 1948
Atlanta gained its first black policemen.
Lastly, the interaction, between Hartsfield and all of the
people mentioned was very important in helping bring about the
hiring of the first black police. If it were not for Hartsfield’s
political insight and maneuvering, the issue may not have been
brought before the city council for a vote. However, Hartsfield’s:
major underlying reason for hiring black police was. politics.
Hartsfield knew that supporting this issue could possible lose him
some white support. By adding restrictions and stipulations. on the
new black police he was able to appease both blacks and whites. With
both groups supporting the restrictions, and both willing to go along
with the idea of hiring black police. The hiring of black police
thus became a reality in that period in Atlanta history,39
These judgements were arrived at prior to and independently~
of Rosenweig, “The Issue of Employing Black I~olicemen,”
CHAPTER III
THE REACTION TO THE BUILDING OF THE
“ATLANTA WALL”
Just as the outlawing of the “white primary” by th.e United
States Supreme Court served as a catalyst for many of the events
that occurred during the 1940’s, so did the 1954 decision in Brown
vs. Board of Education which declared separate but equal
unconstitutional serve as a vehicle for the Civil Rights struggle of
the 1950’s and 1960’s.
Once again, as they had done in the 1940’s, Southern whites
sought to thwart the decision of the Court. They formed White
Citizens.’ Councils that were usually made up of business and
professional people; while the Ku Klux Klan was left with. the task of
again mobilizing the lower—income whites in an all out attempt to
block any gains made by blacks.1
In spite of these organizations and other forms of resistance,
however, blacks made much progress in becoming part of the main stream
of American life during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Brown vs. Board of
Education sounded the death knell to segregation established by law.
This was followed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the first comprehensive
piece of civil rights legislation, which outlawed discrimination in
housing, hiring and public accommodations. An equally important
‘Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America, (New
York: Collier Books, 1964), pp. 239—241.
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piece of legislation was the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which lifted
all restrictions put on black voters, and gave the Attorney General
authority to institute suits on behalf of blacks deprived of voting
rig s. The increase in black voting which resulted was to be a
significant factor in the future events in Atlanta.
Another of these strides occurred in education, on August 30,
1961 when four Atlanta high schools were integrated and this combined
with the integration of several other Southern schools helped to loosen
the hold that the segregationist had over education in the South.
This event, according to Virginia H. Hem in her article, “The Image
of ‘A City Too Busy to Hate’ :Atlanta in the 1960’s,” combined with
some self—confident words of Mayor Hartsfield, was the beginning of
Atlanta’s image as “a city too busy to hate”.3 However, as will be
shown below, the legal fight for integration of neighborhoods was
one of the toughest battles that had to be won. The controversy of
“Atlanta Wall” described below was part of this battle.
In this chapter the researcher will examine Hartsfield’s
mayoral campaign of 1957 and the. reasons for his retirement from office
in 1961 with emphasis being placed on the election of Ivan Allen, Jr.,
under the old Hartsfield coalition of Northside whites and blacks
as new mayor. The researcher will also trace the changes which
occurred in the Atlanta power structure during this period. The
2Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record; BláckAmericans
and the Law, 1849—1970, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970),
pp. 348—426.
3Virginia H. Hem, “The Image of ‘A City Too Busy to Hate’:
Atlanta in the 1960’s,” Phylon 33, (Fall, 1972), 207.
25
major focus for this chapter will be on reactions, especially Hartsfield’s
and ‘Mayor Allen’s, initial response to neighborhood integration,
thereby providing the reader with another view of the racial attitude of
Hartsfield in a different situation.
In Hartsfield’s last primary fight for the office of mayor of
Atlanta, he won a slim victory over his opponent, Fulton County
Commissioner Archie Lindsey. Hartsfield received 37,612 votes to
33,808 for Commissioner Lindsey. In winning the election over
Lindsey, Hartsfield was able to depend on his long established
coalition pattern of carrying the Northside precincts and the black
precinct; however, he was badly beaten in the lower middle—class and
lower—class white sections of the city which voted strongly for
Lindsey.4 It was becoming evident in this primary that Hartsfield1s
strong hold on Atlanta politics was beginning to loosen.
In the December 1957 general election, Mayor Hartsfield’s
opponent was the segregationist Lester Maddox. In the campaign,
Maddox claimed Hartsfield was too moderate on racial matters, that
he ran city hall like a dictator, and hinted that there was corruption
in the Hartsfield administration. Hartsfield on the other hand,
concentrated on the more positive aspects of his administration and
when the issue of race was brought up on several occassions, he
totally avoided the issue. In the election, Hartsfield received
41,300 votes to 23,987 for Maddox, and won a very decisive victory.
As in the primary election, Hartsfield’s voting strength came from
4The Atlanta Journal, 9’ May 1957, (herafter cited as Journal)
and N. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials (New York: The Free
Press of Glencor, 1964), pp. 132—142.
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Northside whites and blacks.5
According to N. Kent Jennings author of Community Influentials,
nearly two years after the general election of 1957, it became
obvious that the business leadership was thinking about withdrawing its
support from Hartsfield. Several factors accounted for the change
of attitude toward Hartsfield. To begin with, Hartsfield’s, as he
grew older, quarrelsome behavior was increasing to an unbearable
point. Then too, he had fought a series of political contests that
had created a great split among voters in the city. Finally, he
seemed to be losing his strong control over the Aldermanic Board.
Newer and younger political leaders were becoming involved in the
political machinery and many of them did not feel any obligation to
him and his coalition.6 Without business community support for
campaign funds, the beginning of the end for the man who had run
Atlanta for so many years was in sight.
After twenty—three and a half years as Mayor of Atlanta,
Hartsfield, on the morning of Wednesday, June 7, 1961, stepped from
his office and announced to a crowd of reporters that he would
not be a candidate in the forthcoming primary. In an evening
edition of The Atlanta Journal on that same day he was quoted as
saying:
I will not be a candidate in the forthcoming primary. I wish
to express my profound thanks to the hundreds of good citizens
in all walks of life who have urged me to run but I believe my
decision is a wise one for myself and my beloved city.7
5lbid, p. 136 and Journal, 5 December~i957, p.1
6Jennings, Community Influentials, p. 138.
7Journal, 7 June 1961, p. 1.
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There probably were many unknown reasons for I{artsfield~s
retirement at that time, frut one thing was for sure — he had been
one of Atlanta’s most memorable mayors.
For his successor, according to Jennings, Hartsfield first
seemed to favor M.M. (“Muggsy”) Smith, a state representative
from Fulton County, who was also the choice of many younger and
more dominant black leaders. Much of the big—business community,
however, united to support of Ivan Allen, Jr., a well—to—do
businessman from a well—established Atlanta family, who was
president of the Chamber of Commerce. Jennings states that banker
Mills B. Lane, Jr., was said to have been the decisive force in
eventually persuading much of the Hartsfield “gang” into backing
Allen.8 Although, according to Ivan Allen, Hartsfield never took
a position in the mayoral race, his announcement that he was not
going to be a candidate gave Allen his chance of winning the
election.9
In the 1961 general election, Allen’s opponent was Lester
Maddox who, as previously mentioned, ran unsuccessfully for mayor
against Hartsfield in 1957. The main issue in the campaign was
school desegregation, with Maddox the segregationist being a
strong advocate of keeping the schools segregated. By receiving
64,330 votes to 36,091 votes for Maddox, Ivan Allen, relying on
much the same voting coalition as Hartsfield had used for so many
8
Jennings, Co~unity Influentials, p. 140.
9lvan Allen, Jr., Mayor Notes on the Sixties (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 40.
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years, hecame At1anta’~ new mayor,~-0
During this time period, Atlanta’s power structure or
establishment was to witness what could be called a changing of
the guard in the passage of power from the old leaders of the
city to the newer leaders. Former Mayor Ivan Allen gives a very’
vivid account on the subject in his Mayor: Notes OntheStxtles,
According to Allen, the transfer of power began taking place in
the early fifties and reached its peak in 1958 and 1959. In
this new group in which he includes himself, he states that it
was composed of
White, Anglo—Saxon, Protestant, Atlantan, business—oriented,
non—political, moderate, well—bred, well—educated, pragmatic,
and dedicated to the betterment of Atlanta as much as a Boy’
Scout troop is dedicated to fresh milk and clean air.
They were children of the Great Depression who had come out of it
with an appreciation for hard work. Nearly ninety percent of them
lived inside a half—mile radius of the intersection of Hab.ershan) and
West Paces Ferry roads on the Northside of the city’, the side of
Atlanta which composed an important segment of the coalition of
blacks and moderate whites that Hartsfield depended on to help him
win many of his mayoral e1ections.U~
These new leaders, according to Allen, were the presidents of
the five major Atlanta banks, men in charge of Atlanta’-based
industries such as Coca—Cola, the presidents of utilities, chairmen
‘°Ibid, p. 33; Jennings, Coimnunity Influentials, p. 140 and
Jack Walker, “Negro Voting in Atlanta; l~53—l96Q,~’ Phylon 24,
(February, 1966), 381.
iivan Allen, Mayor Notes on the Si~ties, pp. 30—31.
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of the three of four top retail stores, the regional branch managers
of leading national firms in the southeast, the presidents of the
larger local businesses, the chairman in charge of Atlanta’s transit
system, and the leading realtors. Lastly, this group had shared
the same problems, interests and ambitions, attended the same
schools, and all were close friends of Allen.~-2
Floyd Hunter in his recent Community Power Succession
challenges some of Allen’s overview, labeling the people in the new
power structure “inheritors”. According to Hunter, the “inheritors”
represented a large portion of the new power, structure; others came
to power through corporate, professional, and political means. Many
of the national corporations were establishing their regional
headquarters in Atlanta, and many of these new corporate heads were
not native Atlantans. What is more, many of the new members of the
power structure did not share in the close—knit upbringing described
by Allen. An example of one of these people was John Portman, the
self—made architect who designed the Peachtree Center and Hyatt
Regency in Atlanta; another was Tom Cousins, a. real estate developer.
But many of the people who did compose this new power structure were
indeed from the group that Allen wrote about in his book.13
The changing of Atlanta’s power structure is very important
if one is to gain an understanding of some of the events that occurred
12 Ibid.
13Floyd Hunter, Coimuunity Power Succession, (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 86—90.
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jn Atlanta during the l95Q.~s. and 196Q’s, Unlike Birmingham and
other Southern cities, Atlanta and her white leaders were willing
to sit down and discuss the issues with blacks, thereby avoiding
many’ of the major violent confrontations that beset many sister
cities in the region.
In 1960, the total population of Atlanta was 302,288. The
black population had increased to 104,154 or 38.8 percent of the
city’s total and was steadily growing. The total number of registered
black voters was 41,469 or 28.9 percent of the total, thereby making
them a very important group when it came to city elections.’4
During the 1950’s and 1960’s, Atlanta like many of the larger
cities of America, was attempting a policy of urban renewal which
called for the demolishing of the older decayed sections of the city
and the rebuilding of these areas. Urban renewal, combined with the
increasing black population, made it necessary for blacks to expand
beyond the traditional neighborhood boundaries that had existed for
them for so many years.
In Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent, an analysis
of urban renewal policy in Atlanta, Clarence N. Stone states that
black residential expansion seemed unavoidable, but white Atlantans
attempted to stop this expansion and in many cases tried to ban and
displace blacks from areas of the city where they had always lived,
Conversely, Blacks wanted to remain in the areas they had always
occupied, and they also wanted to expand into new areas of the city.
For while they made up one.-third of the population, blacks occupied
14
US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Ei~hte&~th
Census of ~theUüited States,~ 1960: Population, 1, p. 60 and Walker,
“Negro Voting in Atlanta,” p. 381.
31
only one—sixth of the residential land.’5
According to Stone, the desire by Black Atlantans to expand
into new residential space was about to interfere with the goals of
most white people of the city who were also attempting to expand
into new residential areas. To stop or control this expansion,
white Atlantans were willing to do anything. To make matters worse, j
I
the white business community hoped to move blacks out of the dying
areas around the city’s business district, thereby displacing even
more of them. Lastly, Atlanta city planners in. the early 1950’s
did not want to integrate housing but, instead, intended to improve
distribution of housing, thereby adding more pressure on this very
hot issue of housing in the city.1-6
Southwest Atlanta was somewhat of an anomaly. This area,
according to Stone, was comparatively affluent and mostly white;
however, blacks were beginning to move into it, along its northern
border. Although this area was physically and psychologically far
different from the Northside area, some public elected officials
who were very important in the city’s politics also lived in
southwest Atlanta. They had used their political influence several
times to stop black expansion and all subsidized housing from being
built in their area.1-7 However, the mounting forces of change would
prove to be much more than even they could have foreseen.
~-5Clarence N. Stone, Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent:
System Bias in the Urban Renewal Program of Atlanta, (Chapel Hill:




Before one can truly understand the crisis that was building,
one must understand what was also occurring in the real estate
market citywide. Real estate transactions during the 1950’s and
1960’s, according to Stone, were limited by “semi—official” and
“understood” boundaries and “buffers” that separated black and white
communities in the city.
While blacks acquiesced in these boundaries and in some
instances were active parties to the so—called gentlemen’s
agreements, there is no question that they would have
preferred an open and unsegregated housing market. Bargaining
from what they regarded as an equal position blacks received
limited amounts of expansion land and the transition of some
neighborhoods from white to black in exchange for acceptance
of a pattern residential segregation.~-8
According to then Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., Peyton Forest, the
neighborhood in which the crisis reached a head, was a white
subdivision near Peyton Road, on the Southwest section of the city,
where the developer became upset with the slow progress of the sale
of homes and began to make threats to whites in the area that he
might start selling homes to blacks. The developer pointed out
that Blacks were already buying homes in adjoining neighborhoods;19
later, he bought an advertisement in The Atlanta Daily World in
which he advertised that homes in the subdivision were up for sale.
Dr. Clint Warner, a black physician, made agreements whereby he might
be able to purchase one of the houses. A white organization, the
Southwest Atlanta Citizens Association, in an all—out effort to stop
expansion in the area, repurchased the house originally bought by
18Ibid., p. 15.
19
Allen, Mayor Notes, p. 71
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Dr. Warner.20
According to the December 13, 1962 issue of the Daily World,
the Public Works Committee in executive session, after a public
hearing on a plan approved and sanctioned by Mayor Allen for closing
certain streets in the Peyton Forest area as a “buffer” between
black and white homeowners, gave his recommendation its endorsement.2~-
Mayor Allen had proposed that some eight hundred acres of land, which
he felt had been improperly zoned commercial, should be re—zoned
and offered to blacks to use for the purpose of building new homes
to coincide with his proposal to close certain streets in the Peyton
Forest area. He justifies this action in his memoirs:
I saw it as a way of accomplishing two things: calming the
white people in the neighborhood and focusing attention on
the unused eight hundred acres so we could get it re—zoned
and put to use for low—priced or middle—priced housing. I
saw it as a happy compromise between two very serious
problems, and thought I could be Solomon before it was
over. But I learned once again, that when you’re dealing
with the public you cannot assume they know all that you
kn22
In response, the Empire Real Estate Board and members of
the black community formed an “All—Citizens Committee” in hopes of
rallying support from the community to halt Mayor Allen’s
sponsored plan for a “buffer” against black expansion. The
committee was headed by Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr.,
20Michael James O’Conner, “The Measurement and Significance of
Racial Residential Barriers in Atlanta, 1890—1970”, (Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Georgia, 1971), p. 112.
21The Atlanta Daily World, 14 December 1962, p. 1. Hereafter
cited as the World.
22Allen, Mayor Notes, pp. 71—72.
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23Reverend H.I. Boardin, and Jesse Hill.
On December 17, 1962, the Aldermanic Board, by a vote of
thirteen to one, passed the plan endorsed by Mayor Allen and the
Public Works Committee to close certain streets in the Peyton Road
area. Soon after, the All—Citizens Committee had Attorney Donald L.
Hollowell file a law suit to stop Mayor Allen and officials of
the city from closing Peyton and Harlan Roads.24
On December 18, 1962 two three—foot high steel enforced
barricades were built on Peyton and Harlan Roads. At that point,
Judge Whitman denied a petition by ten white and black citizens to
stop the city from building the barrier, and ordered the hearing
to be continued on Friday morning; however, a counter—action was
taken in a petition filed in Municipal Court, which called for the
removal of the barriers, contending that they were a “public nuisance”.
To coincide with the actions thatwere taking place a “selective
buying campaign” was initiated against merchants supporting the
ordinance.25 The barrier in question was becoming known as the
“Atlanta Wall” or “Berlin Wall”.
23World, 15 December 1962, p. 1.
24World, 18 December 1962, pp. 1 and 4.
25World, 19 December 1962, pp. 1 and 6, and The Atlanta
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Later on that week, Municipal Court Judge Robert postponed
the hearing on the subject for two weeks on the request of City
Attorney Newell Edenfield, because he argued that he had not had
enough time to prepare for this controversial case. However,
Attorney Hollowell who represented the plantiffs, “urged that the
case be heard immediately because of the emergency situation
involved.” The Judge delayed reconvening the case until 10:00am
January 3, 1963.26
Meanwhile, Mayor Allen had proposed a bi—racial body to
help solve the dispute. He asked that the Negro Voters League,
Empire Real Estate Board, West End Businessmen’s Association, and
the Southwest Civic Association each name three members to study
the problems and work out some sort of resolution. The All—Citizens
Committee, which was made of a number of people from the above group,
spoke out against the idea and declared that there could be no
hi—racial committee until the barricades were first removed. Black
leaders were requesting immediate action on the issue.27
Later, the Atlanta Negro Voters League and the Empire Real
Estate Board called “erroneous” the report that they did not want to
send representatives to help formulate a bi—racial committee to
study the matter.28 An article in The Atlanta Constitution on
December 27, 1962, claimed that the split between Black organizations
26Constitution, 21 September 1962W, p. 7.
27World, 22December 1962, p. 1, Constitution, December 22, 1962,
p. 1, World, 25 December 1962, p. 1. and World, December 26, 1962,
pp. 1 and 6.
28
World, 28-December 1962, p. 1 and 4.
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over whether they should agree to discuss the problems with the
bi—racial committee until the barriers were removed was settled the
night before. There was some dissention on whether or not to talk
until the barriers were removed, with the older people being in
opposition and the younger members pushing for the ideal of no action
until the barriers were removed. In the end, both factions did come jI
to the conclusion to discuss the matter in spite of the barriers not
being first removed, a decision described by an editorial in the
World as “proper and welcomed steps”.29 fr
In a January 2, 1963 Atlanta ,Tournal article entitled “Street
‘Racial Buffer’ Sets No Precedent, Officials Say” by Raleigh Bryans,
one finds Hartsfield’s name appearing on the issue. According to the
article, what blacks called a “precedent”, the building of the buffer,
was not really a precedent at all. The article argues that the same
kind of buffer, “street barricades and all”, had existed on Paxson
Street since 1961 and there were no protests made by blacks against
them; that,the article claimed,the practice of having racial buffers
was an old one and had been exercised many times with the consent of
blacks; and that the earlier precedent Paxson Street was interesting
because it was started during the administration of fcrn~er Mayor
Hartsfield.
This is so because Mr. Hartsfield, in his background, has
been sharply critical of Mr. Allen’s action in setting up
the Peyton—Harlan buffer. Mr. Hartsfield is widely
quoted for one thing, as saying that his successor’s big
mistake was “putting up something that could be photographed” ——
that is, erect the street barricades. Yet putting up a
29
World, 29 December 1962, p. 6 and Constitution, 29 December
1962, p. 3.
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street barricades is precisely what was done by the city when
Mr. Hartsfield was in office, and obviously with his sanction.3°
The following day The Atlanta Constitution published Hartsfield’s
rebuttal to the Journal’s article. Hartsfield declared:
During my term as mayor I do not recall ever having approved
any street abandonment or barriers for racial purposes
anywhere at any time.
Records in the City Clerk’s office show that the Paxson
Street action was ‘a simple resolution’ which was approved by
the Aldermanic Board in my absence and approved along with
hundreds of other papers, not by me but by the President of
the Aldermanic Board who acts in the absence or incapacity of
the Mayor. There was no formal abandonment ordinance, no
advertisement, no publicity and no complaints whatsoever.
Frankly, I never heard of Paxson Street until this story.
In discussing the issue of the construction of the “Wall”
Hartsfielcl judged it an
• . . awful mistake which is not only hurting Peyton Road, but
all of Atlanta. • . In a spirit of goodwill and civic pride I
stand ready to cooperate with Mayor Ivan Allen and the
Aldermanic Board in any movement to eradicate this source
of friction and bad publicity.
This was the only article written in the newspapers during the
incident in which Hartsfield publicly gave his opinion on the
subject.32
30
Raleigh Bryans, “Street ‘Racial Buffers’, Sets No Precedent,
Officials Say,” Journal, 2 January 1963.




(The Atlanta Journal—January 6, 1963)
Although there were many attempts by Ivan Allen and other
members of the city to form a bi—racial co~ittee to attempt to
settle the dispute, these efforts were virtually fruitless. The only
remedy to this controversy proved to the courts; however, even
court action was a long and tedious process. On January 4, 1965, a
Municipal Court judge, Robert E. Jones, threw out a petition that
tried to have the barriers removed.33 On January 7, 1963, the
Aldermanic Board overwhemingly endorsed the “Wall” by defeating a
33 -
Constitution, 5 January 1963, p. 1 and Constitution,
8 January 1963, p. 1.
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resolution to remove the barriers by a ten to three vote.34 However,
blacks were later able to have the courts remedy the situation in
their favor.
On March. 1, 1963, Fulton Superior Court Judge George P.
~Whitman~Sr~, issued a ruling on the “Wall” in which he ordered the
city to destroy the barricades by March 4. Mayor Allen attempted to
waste no time after the ruling was handed down; he had the wall
destroyed within on hour. Attorneys Donald Hollowell, Horace T. Ward,
and Howard Moore had argued the case against the “Wall” in Fulton
Superior Court on behalf of the black and white plaintiffs who
maintained “that the action by the city to build the barriers was
arbitrary and capricious and unconstitutional”. Attorney Hollowell
added that the “motives and intent behind the road closing were not
for the good of all the citizens of Atlanta”.35
Judge Whitman,in handing down his ruling,cited Georgia Supreme
Court decisions of 1915, 1918, and 1924 that struck down Atlanta
ordinances that had attempted to compel road segregation in property
ownership. Judge Whitman was quoted as saying, “It has been the
fundamental law of the state that: the social status of the citizens
,,36
shall never be the subject of legislation.
Mayor Allen later defended the action that he had taken
concerning the incident in his book. He stated that
34World, 2 March 1963, pp. 1 and 8 and Constitution, 2 March 1963,
p. 1.
35Constitution, 2 N~rch 1963,. pp. 1 and 8.
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The people of Atlanta didn’t understand all of the subtleties
of the situation. They only saw a crude barricade — the
“Atlanta Wall” it came to be called — stretched across a road,
making a dividing line between blacks and whites. I had
forgotten an axiom that William 8. Hartsfield once used:
“Never do anything wrong that they can take a picture of.”
The press had a heyday, and the feeling against me was
understandably bitter in the Negro community. “I don’t see
how any decent white man can do what you have done,” said
the Reverend Sam Williams, who had been one of my stronger
supporters in the past.37
Michael James O’Conner in his dissertation on “The Measurement
and Significance of Racial Residential Barriers in Atlanta, 1890—19 70”
judged that before the “Atlanta Wall” incident, Atlanta had a
segregated housing market that was accepted without question and
there was nothing done to stop the practice. However, after the
incident, blacks were able to buy houses on a more equal opportunity
basis and attempts to deny blacks homes were performed with more
discretion.38
In analyzing the Black response to the “Wall”, Mr. George
Coleman, City Editor of the World, stated, “It was not that big of
an issue.”39 Another member of the newspaper, William Alexander
Scott, III, Director of Circulation, informed the researcher that
Mayor Allen’s action concerning the issue was “a retrogressive act
done in the interest of allowing tempers to cool.” He goes on to say,
“Everybody thought it was wrong, but after it was destroyed the
37
Allen, Mayor Notes, p. 72.
38
O’Conner, “The Measurement and Significance of Racial
Residential Barriers in Atlanta,” p. 111.
39lnterview with. George Coleman, The Atlanta Daily World, Atlanta,
Georgia, 16 February 1982..
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tempers had cooled and Dr. Warner executed his right to purchase the
home.” He continued by saying
The need for housing on the middle class level had increased
and they were willing to pay more than whites. When whites
realized that they could get more from blacks than from their
white counterparts they, therefore, were willing to sell their
homes to blacks. In fact, blacks were willing to pay
astronomical high prices. Also, all the ‘Wall’ did was stall
the buying of housing for Blacks for a short time.4°
Overall, the issue of the “Wall” was a very controversial event.
All the major papers of the city constantly kept their readers
abreast of what was happening from day to day. The Atlanta Daily
World, the Black newspaper of the citv,devoted extra attention to
the issue, basically because it involved Black Atlantans.
If Hartsfield had been mayor during this period it is possible
that the issue may not have become as big as it did. Ivan Allen,
being new to the position, did not possess the political genius of
Hartsfield. Hartsfield having worked with blacks in getting the
black policemen was very aware of both black reaction to discrimination
and their potential political power in local elections. He would
have been hesitant to provoke the anger of blacks by building the
“Wall”. His method probably would have been negotiation with blacks,
looking towards having them set their own limits as he did in the
police controversy.
In this controversy over the building of the “Wall”,
Hartsfield’s mild criticism of Mayor Ivan Allen was not in terms of
support for Blacks so much as one of his disdain for Allen’s lack of
40lnterview with William Alexander Scott III, The Atlanta Daily









Three analyses of Hartsfield’s racial attitudes give us a
beginning for summarizing the impact of his administration upon
Black Atlanta. First Roger Williams, in “The Negro in Atlanta”,
judged Hartsfield, “. . .no great liberal as his northern audiences
are suprised to learn today”.1
Second, Clarence Stone, in Economic Growth and Neighborhood
Discontent, offers a more detailed analysis of Hartsfield:
Though Hartsfield’s background did not predispose him to be
a racial liberal, he did bring certain assets to the
changing political scene. He was personally very accessible
to constituents, black as well as white. He never forgot
that constituents were individuals, with particular needs.
But he also had a knack for making gestures that reassured
groups of constituents of his concern for their welfare. He
was a pioneer among Southern white politicians in showing
social courtesies to blacks. While Hartsfield was discreet
about his contacts with black leaders, he nevertheless
openly campaigned for black support and established a good
working relationship with the leaders of the Atlanta Negro
Voters League.
Finally, Hartsfield’s own account for the National League
of Cities, entitled “Cities and Racial Minorities; Atlanta’s Approach”,
presents the best analysis:
1Roger Williams, Jr., “The Negro In Atlanta,” Atlanta Magazine,
Vol. 6, No. 2, (1966).
2Clarence N. Stone, Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent;
System Bias in the Urban Renewal Program of Atlanta (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1976), p. 57. ~
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When I first became Mayor of Atlanta, in 1937, I was elected
under what was known as the white primary —-- a device through
which white citizens of the South had traditionally decided
upon their officials. The ratification was effected through
the general election, but the conclusion was often foregone if
not decided outright by the lack of opposition. This pattern
was the same in all levels of government, in the South, and
had been so since before the turn of the century.
But the winds of social change were blowing, even in 1937.
A Negro citizen of Texas brought suit in his state, charging
that the white primary was a device chiefly for the
disenfranchisement of Negro and thus constituted a denial of
constitutional rights and guarantees accorded by the
Fourteenth ~iuendment. The Supreme Court, as you know,
decided in his favor, and from that time on, the days of the
white primary in the South were numbered. Some hard core
resistance was evident in a few states, as they tried various
responses to the court’s decisions. None were of any lasting
value, and soon the limited political participation of the
Democratic Party was transformed into a more representative
group.
Sooner or later as I talk about Atlanta and its experiences
in these days of trial and political upheaval, I will mention
a fact proudly recorded by all those who value what has
happened in our city. Atlanta has six Negro colleges and
universities. The presence of these institutions of higher
education, together with the confluence of businessmen in
the Negro community, make up a very fine group of educated
men and women. They were and are instrumental in furnishing
through their ability an idcal sort of leadership that is so
necessary for good race relations.
The City of Atlanta, soon after I had reached the Mayor’s
office, began a program of improved liaison between the two
races. Negro citizens were encouraged to come to City Hall
and air their grievances and present their requests for
improvements if they wished to do so. What is probably even
more important, city officials began attending meetings of
Negro citizens and evidencing some interest in Negro civic
affairs. This was not always looked upon with approbation
by some in the white community, but I felt that the first
step was a recognition of a basic equality of citizenship
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status.3
Overall, Hartsfield was a practical politician. He first
showed how practical he was when the black community in the 1940’s
came to him requesting that he hire black police. At first he said
“no”; then he later changed his mind when they were able to register
10,000 new voters. Hartsfield was astute enough to know that if he
did hire black police he would more than likely lose a number of
white votes, and he wanted to have another source of voters to
counterbalance his actions. Later, when the controversy arose over
the building of the “Atlanta Wall”, Hartsfield made a very practical
statement to then Mayor Ivan Allen, “Never do anything wrong that
they can take a picture of.”4
Hartsfield found himself caught up in changing times. He
recognized them. According to Alexander Scott when asked by the major
press how he accounted for his longevity as mayor, Hartsfield replied
“. . .that it was due to his ability to change with the times.”5
Although many of his Southern counterparts were unwilling to work
with blacks, Hartsfield, because he noted that the times were changing,
at least attempted to work with them. Even more important was the
fact that in many of his twenty—three years while he was mayor of
Atlanta, he was able to establish a coalition between Northside
whites and black that had the best interest of the city of Atlanta
3William B. Hartsfield, Cities and Racial Minorities: Atlanta’s
Approach, (Washington: National League of Cities, N.D.; Reprinted
from Marshall—Wythe Symposium, College of William and Mary, 1964),
pp. 3—4.
4Allen, Mayor: Notes on the Sixties, p. 72.
5lnterview with William Alexander Scott, III, The Atlanta Daily
World, Atlanta, Georgia, 1 March 1983.
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in mind. If blacks and whites had not been able to work together,
Atlanta may not have become the city it is today. Finally, Hartsfield
may very well not have been a true “liberal” in today’s terms, but
in his time he was the driving force that Atlanta needed to move -
ahead. One fact will always be true about Hartsfield and that was
he was truly an intelligent and astute politician who will go down j
in history as one of the greatest mayors Atlanta has ever had up F
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